EKWUEME @ 80: MY COUP ORDEAL. Our Reporter October 28, 2012.» Dr. Alexander Ifeanyichukwu Ekwueme, GCON Elder Statesman, former Nigerian Vice President By #Shola Oshunkeye. (Continued from last week) Last Sunday, Second Republic Vice President, Dr. Alexander Ifeanyichukwu Ekwueme clocked 80. To celebrate the man many fondly call bridge- builder, and apostle of politics without bitterness, we ran the first part of his biographical interview with ICON in which he took readers to the innermost recesses of his world. Dr. Ekwueme continues his narrative in this second part of the interview, with an expose on the night General Muhammadu Buhari and his group struck and torpedoed the Second Republic government of President Shehu Shagari. Please, read on. But eventually, he took you people to the tribunal… Where? Nothing. He didn’t. I waited for them for 20 months and they didn’t even come to ask me a question because I was the first person to be detained from December 31. Shagari was in Abuja. We had finished the budget presentation to the National Assembly on December 29, and on the 30th, Shagari went back to Abuja. It was because of the budget presentation that I had to cut my Christmas holiday and come back to Lagos. And as Shagari was going to Abuja, I had to stay back in Lagos. So, what happened on December 31, 1983, the day of General Buhari’s coup against your government? On the day of the coup, they (soldiers) came to my house at about 2 a.m. The people at the gate opened the gate for them and they got into my upstairs sitting room, and the bedroom door was directly opposite. So, they came straight to my bedroom, they knocked on the door. I came out. I was in pyjamas. There were four soldiers, and they all had their automatic weapons pointing at me. I didn’t have to be told what was happening. So, they pointed their guns pointing at me and they said they came to arrest me. Guess what? What, sir? The person who led them to arrest me, incidentally, was the son of my friend, Jokolo. I call him my friend because he always looked after me, the Emir of Gwandu. You know the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Abubakar III, was getting old, and each time I had gone there on official visit, like the Argungu festival, the Sultan would mandate the Emir of Gwandu to receive me. That was how we forged a relationship. And it was his son, Jokolo, that came to arrest me. Jokolo, himself, later became the Emir of Gwandu before he was dethroned. So, the guns were pointing at me, and he (Jokolo) came forward in his starched army uniform, and wanted to talk. I asked him, “What’s all this about?” He said, “We were asked to get you.” I said: “By whom?” He said, “Well, … emmm…emmm…by government.” I said, “Which government?” (Roaring laughter). He said, “Well… sorry, there is a change of government.” I said, “Oh, I see. In that case, let me collect my things, and I will follow you.” So, I came down, I packed my toilet kit. What of mummy, your wife? They were all in the East. Remember, I told you we were already home for Christmas, and they were here. I was alone in Lagos. So, I picked up my Bible, and got into the Peugeot car they brought. They threw me at the back, sandwiched me between two soldiers and he was in front with the driver. Then, we took off. Our next stop was the house of the Speaker (of the House of Representatives), Benjamin Chaha. Unfortunately for the young schoolteacher from Benue, he had just been elected into the House of Representatives. And because of our zoning formula, Benue had to produce the Speaker. That was how he emerged. In the old position, Isaac Shau, from Benue, was to have been the Speaker. But because we had an accord with NPP (Nigerian Peoples Party), the speakership was ceded to NPP. So, Ume-Ezeoke took that position and Isaac Shau became a minister. So, this time, because there was no need for any accord, because we had enough seats to run the National Assembly, so, Chaha, the school-teacher from Benue, became the Speaker. So, we went and pick the small boy. He was just there for three months and the next thing was to find himself in detention at Bonny Camp. Then, they took us to Bonny Camp and went for Jakande. He was the third person. It took about two or three days before they located President Shagari. It’s not as if they didn’t know where to get him anyway… They tried in Abuja but he had left. I think they got him somewhere around Keffi. Anyway, the point I’m making is that because I was the first person they picked up, everything in my house was intact. They collected all my documents in my office, everything. They had access to everything. So, anything they could use, whether fine tooth comb, a microscope, whatever, they used it to comb my house, comb my office, everywhere. They had access to all my papers. So, what other question would they come and ask me? It took them 20 months before they asked a question. And the questions they asked were neither here nor there. What were they questions? I guess they were just fishing. So, they would ask a question and expect me to give an answer. I insisted I would put my answers in writing, in black and white. That I was doing. So, I would say, “In answer to your question, so, so, and so, I now say as follows…” That was what I was doing. That way, my statement had all their questions as well as my answers. Whereas, what they wanted me to do was for them to be asking me questions, and I would be answering. And when they are done, they would take it to wherever, juggle things and twist me out of context. I was smarter than that. The man took my answers and got angry, and said, “No, this is not the way we want you to answer it.” And I said, “But this is the way I want to answer it. I want to tell you what I’m answering, not you taking my answers and twisting them out of context.” He couldn’t handle that but he had no choice. So, that was the situation until Babangida took over. But before Babangida took over, by then, we had moved from Kirikiri to Ikoyi Prisons, which was a medium security prison, which was not as tense as Kirikiri. Then, he (Babangida) said we should be released from there and, then, moved back to house arrest where we started from–Ruxton. Sorry, they took me to Oxford for one night, and to Ruxton for one month, and to Milverton, for one year, all that under 24-hour military guard. It was then that he set up this judicial tribunal with a judge as chairman and an army man, an air force man and a policeman to investigate and scrutinise everything that we did. After that experience, the first time you met Buhari, what was the exchange like? Or you never met him? I met him years after. What was it like? Cold. Who was cold to whom? I was cold to him first… Why? You never forgave him? Well, I’m a human being. I don’t pretend. I don’t know how to hide my feelings. I expected him to, at least, show some remorse for what he did, but, initially, he just took things for granted, after trying to destroy my character because he was a soldier or what? I am older than he is. I don’t know what his educational background is, besides his secondary school certificate. I’m not talking about his military training. He cannot just ride roughshod over me just because he has army uniform. Anyway, the world has a funny way of turning around. The other day, we went to Kano for the turbaning of the Governor of Central Bank, Sanusi Lamido. I not just met him, but as we sat on the first row like this, on my right was Buhari, on my left was Theophilus Danjuma, who, in 1999 when I was contesting with Obasanjo, had said that if I won, he would go into exile! (Hearty laughter) Now, here was I sitting between the two of them. That’s how the world goes. Anyway, I have put everything behind me now. I have since moved on. What was the exchange like among the three of you? You and Buhari on one side; and Danjuma and you on the other side. Quite frankly, I don’t have any more issues with them. Even if they had to joke with it, nobody made any reference to it? No. After that coup happened, I remember Alhaji Uba Ahmed, the national secretary of the NPN (the ruling party) then, saying the president and you actually got wind of the coup several months before it happened. If you did, what did you do about it? Knowing that it was a serious offence, knowing its far-reaching implications for your government and the nation, why didn’t your government do a pre- emptive strike? I didn’t hear anything about the coup. Nobody gave you any information that such a thing was about to happen? Nobody shared any intelligence with you about the coup? No. Nobody gave me any information. But you boss, President Shagari, knew? I doubt that he knew in any details. He may have heard as rumour. But one thing you should know, there were always rumours of coup in those days. You know, the army had been there for 13 years and seven months before we came in. So, it was a nightmare that you had to live with? Yes, it was a clear and present danger that those who had held power without restraint would not be happy to be under subjection. They would want to come back. And you know when they take power, it’s normally for all kinds of things. Coups, to soldiers who took power, were a licence for all kinds of impunity. There is no parliament to checkmate them. There is no party to guide them. It’s just raw dictatorship. So, such people, those who want seats, would always be anxious to come back. And the younger ones who haven’t had a feel of it, who haven’t participated in the enjoyment of the power game, would want to come and become state military administrators. So, it was always a clear and present danger that the military might come back. There was always rumours of coup, and if you have to worry about every rumour of a coup, then, you won’t do your work in government. You just have to go ahead and do your work to the best of your ability. But, occasionally, you may find that one of those rumours may become a reality, and you find yourself entrapped. At the time the military came into our lives, as a nation, on January 15, 1966, do you agree with those who feel it was necessary at that point in time for Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and the four Majors to do what they did? No. There were wide and varied opinions that it was absolutely necessary… Yes. One of my friends and schoolmate, Dr. Lateef Adio Seriki from Epe, came to my office at the time, at 27 Martins Street, Lagos, and said: “Alex, happy New Year!” I shook my head, I said: “Is it because of this thing that has just happened?” I said, “You must know one thing: once this kind of thing starts, you never can tell where and when it would end.” So it is better for us not to get involved in any military coup d’etat. He said, “Alex, maybe you are right.” But there was rejoicing. Some people were rejoicing. And in the West, in particular, it was celebrated. People were moving freely. My youngest brother, a doctor at UCH then, got married on the 22nd of January, a week after the coup, and we were able to go from Lagos by road, to Ibadan, which was hitherto impossible. Before that, I wouldn’t have dared it. In fact, when he fixed that wedding, I told him, “I can’t come to Ibadan, with Operation Wetie going on.” But a week before that, this coup happened and we all went to Ibadan. We had a smooth ride. So, people felt relieved. But I wasn’t one of those rejoicing that there was a coup d’etat. If anything, I felt it was wrong. I felt if there was anything that was wrong, it’s better we brought it to the table and discussed it, and solved it, than to start shooting and killing people. As I said, once it starts, nobody can tell how it would end. Is that not exactly what happened? Is it because the coup targeted mostly political leaders, wiping out a whole generation of political leaders that made it wrong or the principle and philosophy behind the whole of idea? Hmmm… For me, the whole idea of achieving your purpose by using the gun which you are given to protect the citizenry, and you turn around on the leadership or your military superior, killing them, I may be naïve, but I didn’t see that kind of thing as something that I could support. You may be one member of the minority who didn’t see Nzeogwu and the Majors as heroes. Many people saw them as heroes at that point in time… I didn’t support them, I couldn’t have because they solved a temporary problem and created a bigger problem. From January to July 29, there was no peace. The counter-coup came… Before then, in fact, from May 29, they started killing people, mainly Igbo in the North. May, July, September, every two months, people were killed in their numbers, then, on to the civil war, with millions losing their lives, a lot of suffering. Many years after, we have not recovered from that no matter how hard we have tried. When the counter-coup came, Gowon came in, do you think there was a justification for him because people saw the counter-coup as a balancing act by the North? The funny thing is inconsistency of some of our people. Those who were rejoicing on January 15, while I was not, were the same people rejoicing on July 29 when General Aguiyi- Ironsi was killed and the Gowon regime came, and military officers of Eastern Nigeria origin were being hunted down in various military formations. You now discovered that the January killings were not the best thing that happened to Nigeria. On hindsight now, do you think the civil war shouldn’t have happened? The civil war should not have happened at all because every effort was made up to the last minute to stop it by the Aburi meeting in Ghana, chaired by Lt. General Ankra. And there, agreements were reached unanimously as to what should happen, as to what should be done. And everybody was there. Both Gowon and Ojukwu, they were there with their advisers, in full force. And they signed… Then, when they got back here, their permanent secretaries, including many friends of mine, school mates of mine, sat down to analyse the full implications of what they had agreed. And then, they advised Gowon that it should not to be implemented, that these were the implications of it. And he agreed with them and he refused to implement. Of course, the Biafran side said, “On Aburi we stand.” This is something we all voluntarily agreed to do to save the country; now, you are reneging on it. So, onto your tent, o Israel. So, the then Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu was justified in taking the position he took and leading his people? Yes. His people pushed him into it because nobody felt safe anymore in Nigeria. Nobody from this part of the country felt safe in Nigeria after what happened in the North. Even, people of Eastern Nigeria origin coming home from the North by train were massacred inside the train in Benue State. They were massacred so close home. And coming here to have relative security, even in penury, and having been abandoned in all aspects outside, and then for the two sides to agree on how this dilemma can be resolved, and then, for the Nigerian side to say, ‘No, we will not do it anymore,’ wasn’t very palatable even to the illiterate man in the street. They said, well if they were driven home here, and we reached an agreement as to what should be done so that we can start and rebuild, and then, you turn round and say you don’t want to follow that agreement again, and you say you want us to stay under your jackboot, and we stood to be massacred any time you want, we said it is better for us to get away. And even young secondary school students came out to say, “Ojukwu, give us guns.” So, it’s unfortunate that, that last opportunity to pull back from the brink was missed. And secession followed, and civil war followed. Don’t you think it’s the failure of wisdom, on both sides, that actually brought the war, because even after the Aburi Accord was botched, there wasn’t anything, to my mind, that says the warring parties should not explore another opportunity for peace? I say this, with due respect, because, perhaps if that had happened, maybe we would have averted the calamity that befell the nation in those 30 months. One million people slaughtered in 30 months, is that not a price too heavy to pay for peace? Yes, but they have to accept that, all said and done, the war was started on July 6, 1967. It wasn’t started by the Biafran side. Nigeria fired the first shot? Yes! From two fronts! And when you are firing shots at somebody, all he can do is to try to defend himself. And I agree that efforts should be made to solve the problem without resort to war. But, then, at the time, this was not regarded as a war, it was regarded as police action. But, it’s a matter of semantics. Police action? And you mobilise tanks and armoured vehicles? And you are moving into a territory that is occupied by the people who are not from the West, it is a declaration of war. It is an act of aggression. So, it’s very sad. (To be continued next week)
Friday 13 February 2015
EKWUEME @ 80: MY COUP ORDEAL.
EKWUEME @ 80: MY COUP ORDEAL. Our Reporter October 28, 2012.» Dr. Alexander Ifeanyichukwu Ekwueme, GCON Elder Statesman, former Nigerian Vice President By #Shola Oshunkeye. (Continued from last week) Last Sunday, Second Republic Vice President, Dr. Alexander Ifeanyichukwu Ekwueme clocked 80. To celebrate the man many fondly call bridge- builder, and apostle of politics without bitterness, we ran the first part of his biographical interview with ICON in which he took readers to the innermost recesses of his world. Dr. Ekwueme continues his narrative in this second part of the interview, with an expose on the night General Muhammadu Buhari and his group struck and torpedoed the Second Republic government of President Shehu Shagari. Please, read on. But eventually, he took you people to the tribunal… Where? Nothing. He didn’t. I waited for them for 20 months and they didn’t even come to ask me a question because I was the first person to be detained from December 31. Shagari was in Abuja. We had finished the budget presentation to the National Assembly on December 29, and on the 30th, Shagari went back to Abuja. It was because of the budget presentation that I had to cut my Christmas holiday and come back to Lagos. And as Shagari was going to Abuja, I had to stay back in Lagos. So, what happened on December 31, 1983, the day of General Buhari’s coup against your government? On the day of the coup, they (soldiers) came to my house at about 2 a.m. The people at the gate opened the gate for them and they got into my upstairs sitting room, and the bedroom door was directly opposite. So, they came straight to my bedroom, they knocked on the door. I came out. I was in pyjamas. There were four soldiers, and they all had their automatic weapons pointing at me. I didn’t have to be told what was happening. So, they pointed their guns pointing at me and they said they came to arrest me. Guess what? What, sir? The person who led them to arrest me, incidentally, was the son of my friend, Jokolo. I call him my friend because he always looked after me, the Emir of Gwandu. You know the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Abubakar III, was getting old, and each time I had gone there on official visit, like the Argungu festival, the Sultan would mandate the Emir of Gwandu to receive me. That was how we forged a relationship. And it was his son, Jokolo, that came to arrest me. Jokolo, himself, later became the Emir of Gwandu before he was dethroned. So, the guns were pointing at me, and he (Jokolo) came forward in his starched army uniform, and wanted to talk. I asked him, “What’s all this about?” He said, “We were asked to get you.” I said: “By whom?” He said, “Well, … emmm…emmm…by government.” I said, “Which government?” (Roaring laughter). He said, “Well… sorry, there is a change of government.” I said, “Oh, I see. In that case, let me collect my things, and I will follow you.” So, I came down, I packed my toilet kit. What of mummy, your wife? They were all in the East. Remember, I told you we were already home for Christmas, and they were here. I was alone in Lagos. So, I picked up my Bible, and got into the Peugeot car they brought. They threw me at the back, sandwiched me between two soldiers and he was in front with the driver. Then, we took off. Our next stop was the house of the Speaker (of the House of Representatives), Benjamin Chaha. Unfortunately for the young schoolteacher from Benue, he had just been elected into the House of Representatives. And because of our zoning formula, Benue had to produce the Speaker. That was how he emerged. In the old position, Isaac Shau, from Benue, was to have been the Speaker. But because we had an accord with NPP (Nigerian Peoples Party), the speakership was ceded to NPP. So, Ume-Ezeoke took that position and Isaac Shau became a minister. So, this time, because there was no need for any accord, because we had enough seats to run the National Assembly, so, Chaha, the school-teacher from Benue, became the Speaker. So, we went and pick the small boy. He was just there for three months and the next thing was to find himself in detention at Bonny Camp. Then, they took us to Bonny Camp and went for Jakande. He was the third person. It took about two or three days before they located President Shagari. It’s not as if they didn’t know where to get him anyway… They tried in Abuja but he had left. I think they got him somewhere around Keffi. Anyway, the point I’m making is that because I was the first person they picked up, everything in my house was intact. They collected all my documents in my office, everything. They had access to everything. So, anything they could use, whether fine tooth comb, a microscope, whatever, they used it to comb my house, comb my office, everywhere. They had access to all my papers. So, what other question would they come and ask me? It took them 20 months before they asked a question. And the questions they asked were neither here nor there. What were they questions? I guess they were just fishing. So, they would ask a question and expect me to give an answer. I insisted I would put my answers in writing, in black and white. That I was doing. So, I would say, “In answer to your question, so, so, and so, I now say as follows…” That was what I was doing. That way, my statement had all their questions as well as my answers. Whereas, what they wanted me to do was for them to be asking me questions, and I would be answering. And when they are done, they would take it to wherever, juggle things and twist me out of context. I was smarter than that. The man took my answers and got angry, and said, “No, this is not the way we want you to answer it.” And I said, “But this is the way I want to answer it. I want to tell you what I’m answering, not you taking my answers and twisting them out of context.” He couldn’t handle that but he had no choice. So, that was the situation until Babangida took over. But before Babangida took over, by then, we had moved from Kirikiri to Ikoyi Prisons, which was a medium security prison, which was not as tense as Kirikiri. Then, he (Babangida) said we should be released from there and, then, moved back to house arrest where we started from–Ruxton. Sorry, they took me to Oxford for one night, and to Ruxton for one month, and to Milverton, for one year, all that under 24-hour military guard. It was then that he set up this judicial tribunal with a judge as chairman and an army man, an air force man and a policeman to investigate and scrutinise everything that we did. After that experience, the first time you met Buhari, what was the exchange like? Or you never met him? I met him years after. What was it like? Cold. Who was cold to whom? I was cold to him first… Why? You never forgave him? Well, I’m a human being. I don’t pretend. I don’t know how to hide my feelings. I expected him to, at least, show some remorse for what he did, but, initially, he just took things for granted, after trying to destroy my character because he was a soldier or what? I am older than he is. I don’t know what his educational background is, besides his secondary school certificate. I’m not talking about his military training. He cannot just ride roughshod over me just because he has army uniform. Anyway, the world has a funny way of turning around. The other day, we went to Kano for the turbaning of the Governor of Central Bank, Sanusi Lamido. I not just met him, but as we sat on the first row like this, on my right was Buhari, on my left was Theophilus Danjuma, who, in 1999 when I was contesting with Obasanjo, had said that if I won, he would go into exile! (Hearty laughter) Now, here was I sitting between the two of them. That’s how the world goes. Anyway, I have put everything behind me now. I have since moved on. What was the exchange like among the three of you? You and Buhari on one side; and Danjuma and you on the other side. Quite frankly, I don’t have any more issues with them. Even if they had to joke with it, nobody made any reference to it? No. After that coup happened, I remember Alhaji Uba Ahmed, the national secretary of the NPN (the ruling party) then, saying the president and you actually got wind of the coup several months before it happened. If you did, what did you do about it? Knowing that it was a serious offence, knowing its far-reaching implications for your government and the nation, why didn’t your government do a pre- emptive strike? I didn’t hear anything about the coup. Nobody gave you any information that such a thing was about to happen? Nobody shared any intelligence with you about the coup? No. Nobody gave me any information. But you boss, President Shagari, knew? I doubt that he knew in any details. He may have heard as rumour. But one thing you should know, there were always rumours of coup in those days. You know, the army had been there for 13 years and seven months before we came in. So, it was a nightmare that you had to live with? Yes, it was a clear and present danger that those who had held power without restraint would not be happy to be under subjection. They would want to come back. And you know when they take power, it’s normally for all kinds of things. Coups, to soldiers who took power, were a licence for all kinds of impunity. There is no parliament to checkmate them. There is no party to guide them. It’s just raw dictatorship. So, such people, those who want seats, would always be anxious to come back. And the younger ones who haven’t had a feel of it, who haven’t participated in the enjoyment of the power game, would want to come and become state military administrators. So, it was always a clear and present danger that the military might come back. There was always rumours of coup, and if you have to worry about every rumour of a coup, then, you won’t do your work in government. You just have to go ahead and do your work to the best of your ability. But, occasionally, you may find that one of those rumours may become a reality, and you find yourself entrapped. At the time the military came into our lives, as a nation, on January 15, 1966, do you agree with those who feel it was necessary at that point in time for Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and the four Majors to do what they did? No. There were wide and varied opinions that it was absolutely necessary… Yes. One of my friends and schoolmate, Dr. Lateef Adio Seriki from Epe, came to my office at the time, at 27 Martins Street, Lagos, and said: “Alex, happy New Year!” I shook my head, I said: “Is it because of this thing that has just happened?” I said, “You must know one thing: once this kind of thing starts, you never can tell where and when it would end.” So it is better for us not to get involved in any military coup d’etat. He said, “Alex, maybe you are right.” But there was rejoicing. Some people were rejoicing. And in the West, in particular, it was celebrated. People were moving freely. My youngest brother, a doctor at UCH then, got married on the 22nd of January, a week after the coup, and we were able to go from Lagos by road, to Ibadan, which was hitherto impossible. Before that, I wouldn’t have dared it. In fact, when he fixed that wedding, I told him, “I can’t come to Ibadan, with Operation Wetie going on.” But a week before that, this coup happened and we all went to Ibadan. We had a smooth ride. So, people felt relieved. But I wasn’t one of those rejoicing that there was a coup d’etat. If anything, I felt it was wrong. I felt if there was anything that was wrong, it’s better we brought it to the table and discussed it, and solved it, than to start shooting and killing people. As I said, once it starts, nobody can tell how it would end. Is that not exactly what happened? Is it because the coup targeted mostly political leaders, wiping out a whole generation of political leaders that made it wrong or the principle and philosophy behind the whole of idea? Hmmm… For me, the whole idea of achieving your purpose by using the gun which you are given to protect the citizenry, and you turn around on the leadership or your military superior, killing them, I may be naïve, but I didn’t see that kind of thing as something that I could support. You may be one member of the minority who didn’t see Nzeogwu and the Majors as heroes. Many people saw them as heroes at that point in time… I didn’t support them, I couldn’t have because they solved a temporary problem and created a bigger problem. From January to July 29, there was no peace. The counter-coup came… Before then, in fact, from May 29, they started killing people, mainly Igbo in the North. May, July, September, every two months, people were killed in their numbers, then, on to the civil war, with millions losing their lives, a lot of suffering. Many years after, we have not recovered from that no matter how hard we have tried. When the counter-coup came, Gowon came in, do you think there was a justification for him because people saw the counter-coup as a balancing act by the North? The funny thing is inconsistency of some of our people. Those who were rejoicing on January 15, while I was not, were the same people rejoicing on July 29 when General Aguiyi- Ironsi was killed and the Gowon regime came, and military officers of Eastern Nigeria origin were being hunted down in various military formations. You now discovered that the January killings were not the best thing that happened to Nigeria. On hindsight now, do you think the civil war shouldn’t have happened? The civil war should not have happened at all because every effort was made up to the last minute to stop it by the Aburi meeting in Ghana, chaired by Lt. General Ankra. And there, agreements were reached unanimously as to what should happen, as to what should be done. And everybody was there. Both Gowon and Ojukwu, they were there with their advisers, in full force. And they signed… Then, when they got back here, their permanent secretaries, including many friends of mine, school mates of mine, sat down to analyse the full implications of what they had agreed. And then, they advised Gowon that it should not to be implemented, that these were the implications of it. And he agreed with them and he refused to implement. Of course, the Biafran side said, “On Aburi we stand.” This is something we all voluntarily agreed to do to save the country; now, you are reneging on it. So, onto your tent, o Israel. So, the then Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu was justified in taking the position he took and leading his people? Yes. His people pushed him into it because nobody felt safe anymore in Nigeria. Nobody from this part of the country felt safe in Nigeria after what happened in the North. Even, people of Eastern Nigeria origin coming home from the North by train were massacred inside the train in Benue State. They were massacred so close home. And coming here to have relative security, even in penury, and having been abandoned in all aspects outside, and then for the two sides to agree on how this dilemma can be resolved, and then, for the Nigerian side to say, ‘No, we will not do it anymore,’ wasn’t very palatable even to the illiterate man in the street. They said, well if they were driven home here, and we reached an agreement as to what should be done so that we can start and rebuild, and then, you turn round and say you don’t want to follow that agreement again, and you say you want us to stay under your jackboot, and we stood to be massacred any time you want, we said it is better for us to get away. And even young secondary school students came out to say, “Ojukwu, give us guns.” So, it’s unfortunate that, that last opportunity to pull back from the brink was missed. And secession followed, and civil war followed. Don’t you think it’s the failure of wisdom, on both sides, that actually brought the war, because even after the Aburi Accord was botched, there wasn’t anything, to my mind, that says the warring parties should not explore another opportunity for peace? I say this, with due respect, because, perhaps if that had happened, maybe we would have averted the calamity that befell the nation in those 30 months. One million people slaughtered in 30 months, is that not a price too heavy to pay for peace? Yes, but they have to accept that, all said and done, the war was started on July 6, 1967. It wasn’t started by the Biafran side. Nigeria fired the first shot? Yes! From two fronts! And when you are firing shots at somebody, all he can do is to try to defend himself. And I agree that efforts should be made to solve the problem without resort to war. But, then, at the time, this was not regarded as a war, it was regarded as police action. But, it’s a matter of semantics. Police action? And you mobilise tanks and armoured vehicles? And you are moving into a territory that is occupied by the people who are not from the West, it is a declaration of war. It is an act of aggression. So, it’s very sad. (To be continued next week)
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment